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Abstract
Under communism, workers had their wages set according to a centrally-determined
wage grid. In this paper we use new micro data on men to estimate returns to human capital
under the communist wage grid and during the transition to a market economy. We use data from
the Czech Republic because it is a leading transition economy in which the communist grid
remained intact until the very end of the communist regime. We demonstrate that for decades the
communist wage grid maintained extremely low rate of return on education, but that the return
increased dramatically and equally in all ownership categories of firms during the transition. Our
estimates also indicate that men’s wage-experience profile was concave in both regimes and on
average it did not change from the communist to the transition period. However, the de novo
private firms display a more concave profile than SOEs and public administration. Contrary to
earlier studies, we show that men’s inter-industry wage structure changed substantially between
1989 and 1996.
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During a significant part of the twentieth century, over one-third of the world’s
population lived under the communist system. A large proportion of those who were in the labor
force had their wages set according to a centrally-determined wage grid. While the effects of the
grid have never been formally analyzed, there has been a general perception that earnings
structures in centrally planned economies were very compressed and that one should observe
decompression as well as major changes in the wage structure with privatization of state owned
enterprises (SOEs) and the emergence of de novo private firms during the transition to a market
system. In this paper we use new micro data to (a) analyze returns to human capital under the
communist wage grid and (b) examine how wages and returns to human capital changed in the
emerging market economy as the grid was supplanted by two alternatives: free wage setting in
the sector composed of new private firms and a modified wage grid in the public sector and
newly privatized firms.
In analyzing the shift from the Communist wage grid, we have selected the Czech
Republic because it is one of the leading transition economies and also constitutes an excellent
prototype of a sudden change of regimes. In the other leading transition countries, such as Poland
and Hungary, central planners started losing control well before the 1989 revolutions and their
adherence to the wage grid diminished as bargaining between firms and planners gained in
importance. In the Czech Republic the system remained intact until the very end of the
communist regime. Moreover, while the Polish and Hungarian economies had significant private
sectors already before the transition, the Czech economy was almost 100 percent state owned
until 1990 and then underwent one of the most rapid and extensive privatizations in the former
Soviet bloc.
The studies carried out to date have examined returns to human capital in a cross-
sectional setting using one point in time during the transition and, in some cases, also one point
in time under communism. However, no study has (a) analyzed the determinants of wages andestimated returns to human capital using micro data on the same individuals during a large part
of the communist and transition period, and (b) used the ownership of firms in which these
individuals work to examine the impact of ownership on return to human capital and wages
during the transition.
Our study uses a unique data set and examines these key questions. We analyze the
evolution of the returns to education and experience for a sample of male workers in the Czech
Republic during most of the communist era (1955-1989) and during the 1991-96 period of
transition from plan to market. We have collected a retrospective data set that contains work
histories of a panel of 2,284 men, most of whom worked under communism, all of whom worked
during at least part of the 1990-96 transition period, and many of whom worked in December
1996, the date of our survey. No other data set currently provides historical information on
individuals for such long periods of communism and transition.
Using these micro data, we demonstrate that the functioning communist system
succeeded in using the wage grid to set and maintain for decades extremely small wage
differentials. Indeed, the estimated rate of return on education is very small and constant for
decades during the communist rule. At the level of individual and household incomes, the effects
of the wage grid translated into the most egalitarian distribution of income in the world.
The transition from the centrally planned to a market system resulted in a major gradual
increase in the rates of return to education, with the rates of return reaching West European levels
by 1996. This increase is found in all ownership categories of firms. Hence, in the face of the
reduced subsidies to SOEs and the opening of the economy to world competition, the new wage
grid used by SOEs, public administration and privatized SOEs did not cause these firms to
deviate substantially in terms of returns to education from the de novo private firms.
Our cross-sectional and longitudinal estimates of the effects of experience on earnings
indicate that men’s wage-experience profile was concave in both regimes and did not change
from the communist to the transition period. These results imply that the experience-wage grid
used by planners to set starting wages was maintained during the entire communist period andwas not substantially altered during the first six years of the transition. However, we find that the
de novo private firms have a more concave profile than SOEs and public administration and that
they pay a higher experience return than SOEs and public administration to the recent entrants in
the labor market.
Contrary to earlier studies that found the inter-industry wage structure to be stable and
similar in market and centrally planned economies, we show that men’s inter-industry wage
structure changed substantially between 1989 and 1996 as the economy switched from central
planning to a nascent market system. In particular, men working in mining and quarrying lost
much of their former wage premium, while those in trade, transport and telecommunications,
light manufacturing, and “other” activities gained significantly.1. Introduction
During a significant part of the twentieth century, over one-third of the world’s
population lived under the communist system. A large proportion of those who were in the labor
force had their wages set according to a centrally-determined wage grid. While the effects of the
grid have never been formally analyzed, there has been a general perception that earnings
structures in centrally planned economies were very compressed and that one should observe
decompression as well as major changes in the wage structure with privatization of state owned
enterprises (SOEs) and the emergence of de novo private firms during the transition to a market
system. In this paper we use new micro data to (a) analyze returns to human capital under the
communist wage grid and (b) examine how wages and returns to human capital changed in the
emerging market economy as the grid was supplanted by two alternatives: free wage setting in
the sector composed of new private firms and a modified wage grid in the public sector and
newly privatized firms.
In analyzing the shift from the Communist wage grid, we have selected the Czech
Republic because it is one of the leading transition economies and also constitutes an excellent
prototype of a sudden change of regimes. In the other leading transition countries, such as Poland
and Hungary, central planners started losing control well before the 1989 revolutions and their
adherence to the wage grid diminished as bargaining between firms and planners gained in
importance (see e.g., Rutkowski, 1994). In the Czech Republic the system remained intact until
the very end of the communist regime and evidence from large firm-level data sets indicates that
there was no significant rent sharing by workers (Basu, Estrin and Svejnar, 1998). Moreover,
while the Polish and Hungarian economies had significant private sectors already before the
transition, the Czech economy was almost 100 percent state owned until 1990 and then
underwent one of the most rapid and extensive privatizations in the former Soviet bloc.
2
                                                     
2 See e.g., Dyba and Svejnar (1995).The studies carried out to date have examined returns to human capital in a cross-
sectional setting using one point in time during the transition and, in some cases, also one point
in time under communism.
3  However, no study has (a) analyzed the determinants of wages and
estimated returns to human capital using micro data on the same individuals during a large part
of the communist and transition period, and (b) used the ownership of firms in which these
individuals work to examine the impact of ownership on return to human capital and wages
during the transition.
Our study uses a unique data set and examines these key questions. We analyze the
evolution of the returns to education and experience for a sample of male workers in the Czech
Republic during most of the communist era (1955-1989) and during the 1991-96 period of
transition from plan to market. We have collected a retrospective data set that contains work
histories of a panel of 2,284 men, most of whom worked under communism, all of whom worked
during at least part of the 1990-96 transition period, and many of whom worked in December
1996, the date of our survey. No other data set currently provides historical information on
individuals for such long periods of communism and transition.
Using these micro data, we demonstrate that the communist system used the wage grid to
set and maintain for decades extremely low rate of return on education – a finding that was
conjectured but never shown empirically before. We also show that the transition resulted in a
major increase in the rates of return to education, with the rates of return reaching West European
levels by 1996. This increase is found in all ownership categories of firms. Hence, in the face of
reduced subsidies and opening of the economy to world competition, the new wage grid used by
SOEs, public administration and privatized SOEs did not cause these firms to deviate
substantially in terms of returns to education from the market-driven de novo private firms. Our
estimates of the effects of experience on earnings indicate that men’s wage-experience profile
                                                     
3  See for example Bird, et al. (1994), Chase (1998), Flanagan (1995), Jones and Illayperuma (1994),
Krueger and Pischke (1995), Nesterova and Sabirianova (1999), Orazem and Vodopivec (1997) and
Rutkowski (1996).was concave in both regimes and on average it did not change from the communist to the
transition period. However, the de novo private firms display a more concave profile than SOEs
and public administration and they pay a higher experience return than SOEs and public
administration to the recent entrants in the labor market. Contrary to earlier studies that found the
inter-industry wage structure to be stable and similar in market and centrally planned economies,
we show that men’s inter-industry wage structure changed substantially between 1989 and 1996,
with men working in mining and quarrying losing much of their former wage premium, while
those in trade, transport and telecommunications, light manufacturing, and “other” activities
gaining significantly.
The paper is organized as follows: In Section 2 we provide a brief institutional
background, while in Section 3 we describe our data and methodology. In Section 4 we present
our empirical findings on returns to education under the communist grid and during the
transition, while in Section 5 we compare the corresponding returns to experience. In Section 6
we examine the effect of firm ownership on the returns to education and experience and in
Section 7 we analyze the shift in inter-industry wage differentials from the communist to the
transition period. We conclude the paper in Section 8.
2. The Institutional Background
As in other centrally planned economies, after the 1948 communist takeover of
Czechoslovakia the government introduced the wage grid, leaving little discretion for wage
setting at the enterprise level by managers or unions. While in principle the trade unions and
government jointly determined the grid and the level of wages within the grid, in practice the
union and government officials by and large implemented the Communist party policies as set
out in the central plan.
4
                                                     
4 See e.g., Windmuller (1970) and Svejnar (1974).In Tables 1 and 2 we present examples of 1954 and 1984 grids, respectively.  As may be
seen from the two figures, while the structure of the grid changed somewhat during these thirty
years of the Communist regime, the principles underlying the grid remained the same.  Wage
levels were a function of the individual’s education, experience, occupational classification and
the industrial sector of the job.  Central planners for instance favored the “productive” sectors
(industry, construction and agriculture) over the “unproductive” sectors (trade and services) and
wages in the productive sectors were hence boosted above the others.  Adjustments were also
made for the number of hours worked per week, and in earlier years for the difficulty of work
(whether or not the job included supervisory activities, larger plots of land, etc).  In some years,
the location of the job within the government hierarchy (headquarters vs. branch office) mattered.
The wage dispersion across the various categories in the grid was modest, given that unskilled
workers were the pillar of the regime and the communist ideology dictated that wage differentials
between the skilled and unskilled be kept small.
5 Moreover, the planners calibrated the grid in
such a way that they created a positive relationship between experience and wages in the first ten
(twenty) years of experience in 1954 (1984) and a flat wage-experience profile thereafter.
Overall, as may be seen from the 1984 grid, the ratio between the highest and lowest wage was
4.1, which is much smaller than the ratio found in western market economies. Correspondingly,
during the communist period income distribution in Czechoslovakia and the other Central and
East European (CEE) countries was one of the most egalitarian in the world (see e.g., Atkinson
and Micklewright, 1992).
                                                     
5  Discussions with officials who used to administer the wage grid indicate that the process was taken
very seriously and that administrators from various Soviet bloc countries compared notes and
experiences. In this respect, the wage grid was an integral part of the centrally planned system.In addition to regulating wages, the central planners regulated employment and
admissions to higher education.  With minor exceptions, all able-bodied adults were obliged to
work.  Jobs were provided for everyone and employment security was assured.  For higher level
jobs, assignment was usually based on political loyalty.  As was clear after the communist
takeover of 1948 and several times later during minor or major political upheavals, many
experienced and educated professionals were demoted to unskilled jobs and replaced with loyal
communist party members who often had less education.  Similarly, in the selection process for
admission to senior high schools and universities, weight was given to working class background
and communist party membership of the parents.
Since the collapse of communism at the end of 1989, market forces have been
increasingly determining wages, employment and even access to education.  Access to higher
education has been determined primarily by entrance examinations and the supply of and demand
for education have risen.  From 1989 to 1996, enrolment rates in high schools increased from
83.7 to 95.9 percent of the population 15-18 years of age.  During the same period, enrolments
for university education rose from 17.1 to 20.0 percent of the population 19-23 years of age.  Job
matching has become a decentralized exercise between workers and employers, with party
affiliation no longer playing a part.
6
As mentioned earlier, our data permit us to analyze wage setting via the grid versus
market in the 1990s. In particular, the public sector and the privatized SOEs continued to use a
modified wage grid throughout the 1990s, while the new private firms have relied on market
forces since the early 1990s.
7 We are hence able to compare the wage effect of the grid that was
                                                     
6 The government now plays an enabling role through 76 District Labor Offices whose function is to
improve the operation of the labor market by helping the unemployed to find jobs.
7 In order to obtain a better understanding of how the wage-experience relationship varies withimposed on the entire economy under communism to the post-communist effect of (a) the grid
that was used by the public sector and privatized SOEs and (b) the market wage setting process
of the de novo private firms. In Table 3 we present the major elements of the wage grid used in
the public sector in 1998.  In comparison to its communist predecessor, the transition grid was
substantially simplified by the deletion of the industry dimension, but the number of salary
classes was increased from nine to twelve, as was the number of wage raises with experience
(i.e., number of columns).  Moreover, there is evidence of somewhat greater wage dispersion as
the ratio between the highest and lowest wage rose to 4.8. The question that naturally arises is
whether the rate of return on human capital under the transition grid matched or fell short of the
market return provided by the new private firms.
3. Data and Methodology
3.1 Data
We use data from a retrospective questionnaire that was administered in December 1996
to 3,157 randomly selected households in all 76 districts of the Czech Republic.  The
questionnaire first asks for the wage and other characteristics of the jobs held in January 1989,
the first month of the last year of the communist regime.
8  Since the “big bang” of price
liberalization and other transition measures occurred in Czechoslovakia on January 1, 1991, the
                                                                                                                                                                          
ownership, we have examined the internal wage setting practices within several hundred firms with
diverse ownership. The enterprise sample comes from Trexima, one of the largest professional research
firms in the Czech Republic. We have found that as late as 1998, most state owned and privatized firms
still used a modified wage grid that had been carried forward from the communist days. In contrast, the
de novo private firms have been found to operate without such a grid. Moreover, government
intervention in private sector wage setting has been minimal, although some loose wage controls were
in effect intermittently from 1991 to 1995.
8  The January 1989 date was selected as a point in time for which people were likely to remember their
labor market characteristics since 1989 was the year of the revolution that toppled the communist
regime. See Munich et al. (1997) for a description of the survey and sample design as well as the
descriptive statistics of the sample relative to the Labor Force Survey data.questionnaire then traces the characteristics of all the jobs held by the surveyed individuals
between January 1991 and December 1996.  As a result, we have continuous labor market
histories of each individual during the 1991-96 period.  In particular, for each job we have the
start wage and average hours of work, as well as the industry and ownership of the worker’s firm.
For the individuals employed in January 1991, the time of the big bang, we have also obtained
information on wages and other characteristics at the start of the job held in January 1991.  The
starting dates of the jobs held in January 1991 span the entire 1948-89 communist period and we
have used data from 1955 onward.
9 Finally, for the 1991-96 period we have collected
information on each person's household and demographic characteristics, including changes in
education and marital status.
The sample is representative of the 1996 population in terms of major demographic
characteristics. It yields employment histories of 2,284 men who were employed for a minimum
of two weeks during the period between January 1, 1991 and December 31, 1996. For the
“mature” communist period of 1955-89, we use data on (a) the starting wages of 1285 men who
also held a job in January 1991 and (b) the cross section of wages of  1955 men who were
working during January 1989 (the first month of the last year of communism). For the transition
period, we use cross section observations on wages and job characteristics of the 1639 men who
worked in December 1996, as well as the job start information on 2107 men during the 1991-96
period. The data hence permit us to estimate (a) cross-sectional earnings functions using data
                                                     
9  In fact, this question yielded data on jobs that began as early as the 1940s -- 0.3 percent of all the job
starts reported occurred before 1951, 2.6 percent occurred during the 1951-60 period, 5.5 percent
during 1961-70, 9.2 percent during 1971-80, 18.9 percent during 1981-90, and 63.5 percent during
1991-96.  We felt that the very early data points went too far back in time to be reliable and that they
might also be confounded with the systemic changes that accompanied the communist takeover of
1948.  As a result, we restricted our observations on job starts to those that occurred from 1955 onward
since by 1955 the revolutionary period, nationalization and currency reform that followed the
communist coup d’etat of 1948 were over and the centrally planned system was fully in place.
However, in order to test if our results are sensitive to the inclusion of observations from the 1950s,
1960s and 1970s, we have re-estimated our models with sub-samples that dropped observations on jobs
that started before the1980s, 1970s and 1960s, respectively. We found only negligible differences in
the various results.from ongoing jobs at one point in time near the end of communism (January 1989) and one point
in time in mature transition (December 1996), and (b) earnings functions using a long (1955-96)
period of job start data under both regimes.
In appendix Table A.1, we present the 1989 and 1996 means and standard deviations of
the variables that we use in estimating the cross-sectional earnings functions. In appendix Table
A.2, we report the corresponding information for the job start data during communism and the
transition. As may be seen from the tables, the variables display sensible values and considerable
variation both cross-sectionally and over time. Since manufacturing was the key part of the
communist economy, over one-half of the men have apprenticeship education.
3.2 Estimation Strategy
In order to obtain estimates of the wage structure and returns to human capital at the end
of communism (1989) and at a relatively late date during the transition (1996), we first estimate
the following augmented human capital earnings function with our 1989 and 1996 cross-
sectional data:
ι ε β α α α α α + ′ +   + 4 i i
2
i 3 i 2 i 1 0 i P   X     +   X     + E     +     =    W A ln , (1)
where lnWi, the natural logarithm of the monthly earnings of individual i, is taken to be a
function of the individual’s educational attainment (Ei), number of years of his potential labor
market experience Xi, a dummy variable for whether the individual worked in Prague (Pi), and a
set of ten industry dummy variables for the industry location of the individual’s job (Ai).
10 The
                                                     
10 The monthly nominal earnings are meant to be net of payroll and income taxes. This is the most
common way that the Czechs recall their salary, since both of these taxes are taken out before they
receive their pay.  However, about 25 percent of the respondents preferred to report their gross rather
than net earnings. As a result, we have included as a regressor a dummy variable to control for this
discrepancy in reporting. In addition, net earnings in some cases include benefits provided by the state,
through the employer, for raising children. We have therefore also included a dummy variable to
control for the cases when the reported earnings include children benefits.dummy variables A and P are included to control for industry wage effects, compensating
differentials, and agglomeration effects of the large, central city.  We have also estimated the
traditional Mincer (1974) equation by omitting A and P from equation (1), but the coefficients on
education and experience were virtually the same. In what follows we hence report estimates of
the augmented equation (1).
11 We limit our analysis to workers with full-time jobs.
An important stylized fact from the human capital literature is that the effect of education
on wages often depends on how the education variable E is measured. We use three different
specifications of E: i) the actual self-reported number of years of education, ii) the highest level
of attained schooling, and iii) a combination of i) and ii) above.
12
The “number of years of education” specification yields an estimate of a constant
marginal rate of return on an additional year of schooling, at any level, and reflects the approach
advocated for instance by Layard and Psacharopoulos (1974). The “highest level of educational
attainment” by type of degree obtained allows the rate of return to vary across types of completed
education and reflects the criticisms of the assumption of an identical rate of return to each year
of education (e.g., Heckman, Layne-Farrar and Todd, 1995).
13 By including both sets of
education variables, we are able to test between these competing specifications and see which
one is better supported by the data in the communist and transitional contexts. Moreover, since
we have data on actual years of schooling reported by the respondent,
14 rather than years imputed
by the researchers from the reported school attainment, we can test the validity of the
“sheepskin” hypothesis that “wages rise faster with extra years of education when the extra year
also conveys a certificate “ (Hungerford and Solon, 1987).
15
                                                     
11 We have also tested for the effect of marital status in equation (1) and found it to be insignificant.
12 We would like to thank Orley Ashenfelter for suggesting this combined specification to us.
13 Our data permit us to estimate a specification with six categorical variables reflecting the highest
degree attained: 1) junior high school (mandatory education of 9 years), 2) apprentices in 2 year
programs, 3) apprentices in 3 year programs, 4) technical high school graduates and apprentices in 4
year programs who received the technical high school diploma, 5) academic high school graduates, and
6) university graduates and above.
14 The respondents were asked not to report any years of repeated grades.
15 The “sheep skin effect” hence refers to the fact that wages may not increase steadily with years of
education within a given school but may jump up when a degree is received (see Shanahan, 1993 andAs in most studies of human capital, our labor force experience variable X is calculated as
the individual’s age minus the sum of the individual’s years of schooling and basic school
enrollment age of six years.
16 In order to provide a good sense of the nature of the experience-
earnings profile, we use two alternative specifications of experience: the traditional quadratic one
and a spline function that fits the profile to three categories of years of experience.
Equation (1) enables us to compare cross-sectional estimates for late communism (1989)
and mature transition (1996). For estimations covering the 1991-1996 period we are able to
include additional variables that capture important aspects of the transition and which are not
relevant for the communist period.  In particular, using our 1996 cross-section data, we estimate
an equation that includes ownership dummy variables that capture whether the individual works
in public administration or in a state-owned, privatized or de novo private firm. Finally, since we
have data on wages at the start of jobs, we are also able to estimate continuous changes in the
returns to human capital during the communist and transition periods. In order to capture these
changes in a simple way, we estimate a time-varying-coefficient model by interacting the
education (E) and experience (X and X 
2) variables with a monthly time trend. We stratify the
data by the pre- and post-January 1991 periods and estimate separate time-varying-coefficient
equations for the communist and transition periods.
17
It has become customary in the literature on earnings functions to correct for coefficient
bias that may be brought about by the self-selection of a segment of non-representative
                                                                                                                                                                          
Heckman et al., 1996). According to this hypothesis, drop-outs get lower returns to schooling than their
schoolmates who obtain a degree. Using U.S. data, Hungerford and Solon (1987) for instance find
significant discrete jumps in the return to education upon receiving a degree.
16 The shortcoming of this variable is that it includes periods during which the individual may have been
out of the labor market and acquired less labor force experience.  This of course tends to be more of a
problem in the case of women than men because of the gaps in women’s labor market experience
during their maternity leaves (Mincer and Polachek, 1974 and Mincer and Ofek, 1982). We have hence
not tried to adjust our calculated measure of experience.
17 Since the dependent variable is in nominal terms, in all the models that use earnings data over time
(with variable coefficients) we include annual dummies to control for changes in prices. We have also
tested for the validity of a higher than linear time-varying-coefficient model but we have not found
strong support for this higher order specification.individuals (usually women) into the labor market. Since labor force participation rates of both
women and men declined dramatically after the fall of communism, we have tested for the
presence of a selectivity bias in our sample of men.
18 We have derived Heckman’s (1979) λ  by
estimating a probit equation with the 1996 cross-section data, using as explanatory variables age,
age
2, education (in years), a marital status dummy, a dummy variable for the presence of children
under 15 years of age in the household, the per capita household income minus the income of the
respondent, a dummy variable for Prague and the district level vacancy rates (the number of
vacancies per working age population).  The estimation yields positive and significant λ  but the
estimated coefficients on education and experience remain unaffected by the correction
procedure (Table A.8). We hence report the uncorrected estimates.
4. Empirical Findings on Returns to Education
We divide our discussion of the returns to education into three parts: In Section 4.1 we
present the results on the returns to a year of education, in Section 4.2 the returns to an
educational level and in Section 4.3 the returns within the larger encompassing model.  All
estimates are from specifications that control for heteroskedasticity using the White (1980)
method.
4.1 Returns to a Year of Education
In Table 4 we present our 1989 and 1996 cross-sectional estimates of the rates of return to
a year of education based on equation (1).
19  For comparative purposes, we also report the
corresponding estimates from other studies in the Czech Republic and other selected countries.
Our estimates suggest that in the last year of communism (1989), men’s rate of return to a
year of education was 2.7% and that by 1996 the rate rose to 5.8%.  Our findings are in line with
                                                     
18 Paukert (1995) finds that between 1989 and 1994 labor force participation rates of men and women
(over 15 years of age) fell between six and eight percentage points in the Czech Republic, Hungary,
Poland and Slovakia, and that the absolute decline was about the same for men and women in each
country.
19 The complete set of our estimates of equation (1) using the 1989 and 1996 cross-sectional data is
presented in appendix Table A.3.the cross-sectional estimates obtained for the Czech Republic by Chase (1998), and they display
a similar pattern to that found by the cross-sectional studies in other CEE countries, except East
Germany.  The pattern indicates that the rate of return on education was low under the
communist wage grid and that it rose significantly during the transition. The difference in our
estimated coefficients over time is significant at 1 percent significance level. Comparing our
finding to those from other countries, we show that within a few years after the start of the
transition the rates of return on a year of education in CEE and Russia became similar to the rates
in Western Europe, but not as high as those in the United States and Latin America (Table 4).
As may be seen from Table 5, the coefficients on the interaction terms of the 1955-90
time-varying-coefficients model are insignificant, indicating that under the communist wage grid
the rate of return to a year of schooling was small at 1.7 percent and remained constant over time.
Moreover, our statistical comparisons of the point estimates obtained from the longitudinal 1955-
90 data in Table 5 and the cross-sectional 1989 data in Table 4 indicate that there was no
statistically significant difference between these estimates. We hence document extremely low
and astonishingly stagnant wage differentials based on education under the decades of central
planning, a finding that was conjectured but never supported with micro data.
In contrast, our time-varying-coefficient estimates in Table 5 show that the estimated rate
of return to a year of education rose rapidly during the 1991-96 period of transition, with the
monthly rate of increase averaging 0.08 percent.
4.2 Estimates Based on Attained Levels of Education
In Table 6, we report 1989 and 1996 cross-sectional estimates of the returns to several
different levels of schooling, relative to the mandatory junior high school. (The full set of
estimated parameters is presented in Table A.4.) We use these estimates to calculate the annual
returns to a year of education within each completed category of schooling.
20  The time-varying
                                                     
20 Each of the four schooling levels below university level represents a direct path from junior high
school. Hence, the annual return to a year of education within these levels of schooling relative to
junior highs school (rs) is calculated as the nth root of the rate of return to the schooling level (Rs),
where s represents the level of schooling and n represents the number of years of education in eachcoefficients for these levels of education over time are presented in Table 7 and the
corresponding full set of parameters is reported in appendix Table A.7.
As may be seen from the first column and first five rows of Table 6, at the end of the
communist regime the earnings differentials related to different types of schooling were quite
small. In particular, in 1989 a university educated man earned on average just 28.3% more than
an otherwise identical man with a junior high school education. Similarly, men with a vocational
high school degree earned 12.7% more than their counterparts with a junior high school
education.  Finally, the difference in the earnings of individuals with an apprenticeship
background and junior high school graduates was small to negligible.
By 1996 the returns to higher levels of education increased dramatically. A university
educated man earned 72% more (coefficient of .544) than his counterpart with junior high school
education.
21  The difference between the 1989 and 1996 coefficients on university education is
significantly different at the 0.01 confidence level. We also find that the 1996-89 difference in
the returns to a vocational high school education is highly significant and that the percentage
increase in this return is the largest among all the education levels.  On the other hand, the return
to an apprenticeship did not change significantly over time.
As may be seen from the calculated annual rates of return for each level of education in
1989 (Table 6), in late communism the marginal return to a year of education was almost the
same in all levels of schooling. Yet, by 1996 the marginal return to a year of academic or
vocational high school education rose above the return to a year of apprenticeship or university
education, thus providing support for the hypothesis of uneven returns to education across
educational categories. When we estimate the time-varying-coefficient model using wage data
from the 1955-90 period, we find no change in the returns over time (Table 7). We also find that
the differences in returns among the various levels of education are analogously small as in the
                                                                                                                                                                          
level: rs = (Rs)
1/n .  However, the return to a year of university education represents a return above either
academic or vocational high school, and hence it is calculated as ru = (Ru  -  hs R )
1/n , where bar denotes
the average value.
21 The coefficient is calculated as [exp(0.544)] – 1 = 72%.estimates based on the 1989 cross section data.
22 The corresponding 1991-96 estimates indicate
that during the transition period the rate of return on education rose significantly for men in all
educational categories except for academic high school.
Overall, our cross sectional and longitudinal findings indicate that the education-related
wage differentials were small and stagnant under communism. The introduction of market forces
has resulted in increasing wages in all phases of one’s job tenure for those with vocational high
school and university education, but the gains were smaller for those with lower education levels.
4.3 Regressions with Years and Levels of Education
In order to assess the relative merits of the specifications with years of education vs.
highest level of attained schooling within the communist wage grid and during the transition, we
have estimated regressions that include both actual years of education and the highest attained
level of education as regressors. The results in Table 8 are based on the 1989 and 1996 cross
sectional data and control for the variables listed in equation (1). As may be seen from these
estimates, for 1989 we find some statistically significant coefficients on levels of education but
the coefficient on years of education is insignificant. By 1996, the differences among the
estimated coefficients on educational levels increase and the coefficient on years of education,
while still small in absolute terms, becomes statistically significant. However, when we perform
F tests on pair-wise differences of the various coefficients between 1989 and 1996, we do not
find any of the differences to be statistically significant (Table 8).
The results in Table 8 indicate that the wage setting mechanism of the communist grid is
better approximated by the educational attainment specification than by a model based on years
of education. Indeed, the complete lack of significance of the coefficient on years of education in
1989, holding the effect of school attainment constant, is consistent with the emphasis that the
planners placed through the wage grid on observable and verifiable attainment, supported by
                                                     
22 The 1955-90 results also indicate that men with academic high school and university degrees had
higher starting wages than others and that the wages of high school and university graduates were not
statistically different from each other (p-value of 0.96).certificates and diplomas. The finding that by 1996 the coefficient on years of education is
significant but small, while the coefficients on educational attainment become significantly
different from one another, indicates that during the transition both models receive some support
in the data.
The estimates reported in Table 8 also point to the presence of sheepskin effects.
Controlling for the number of years of education, one finds a significant joint effect associated
with completing degrees (i.e., one rejects the hypothesis that the coefficients on the five
educational levels are jointly zero), as well as significant individual sheepskin effects for
university and both types of high school education.
The estimates reported in Table 8 are based on a specification that constrains all years of
education, conditional on attainment, to have the same rate of return. Our data permit us to go
beyond this specification and estimate a less restrictive model. Since we know each individual’s
reported years of education (net of any repeated grades) and the number of years corresponding
to degrees in different types of schooling, we can calculate the number of years that each
individual attended in a degree program that he did not complete. It turns out that the number of
individuals who attended but did not complete the next higher level of education (i.e., number of
dropouts) is considerable: 5, 10, 5, and 10 percent, respectively, of those reporting junior high
school, vocational program, high school, and university as their highest attained level of
education. We can hence identify the sheepskin effect with the rate of return on the incomplete
education of these dropouts, controlling for their completed educational attainment. In particular,
we have re-estimated the earnings regressions with the addition of interaction terms between the
dummy variables for highest attained educational level and the difference between the number of
years of actual and imputed education.  The results (not reported here in a tabular form) show a
zero rate of return on the incomplete education under communism in 1989 and a small rate of
return during the transition in 1996. In 1996, the estimated effect shows that the drop-outs earnedmore than individuals with only the attained level of the drop-outs, but less than individuals who
completed the educational level that was not fully attained by the drop-outs.
23
Since many other studies have to impute the information on years of education from data
on attainment, we have taken advantage of the dual reporting in our data and re-estimated our
regressions with the imputed years of education in order to assess the magnitude of the errors-in-
variables bias of this indirect measure. Interestingly, rather than generating the expected
downward bias in the education coefficient, the imputed education measure yields coefficient
estimates that are 1-2 standard errors higher than the estimates based on reported years of
education. This is brought about by the fact that educational attainment underestimates the actual
number of years of education because a substantial part of the population has attended school
beyond the highest attained degree. Our analysis hence indicates that studies that impute years of
education from educational attainment and do not control for the drop-out phenomenon may
severely overestimate the rate of return on education, as long as there is no extensive grade
repetition as is the case in the Czech Republic. Since we do not know which of the studies
reported in Table 4 use the imputed vs. actual number of years of schooling, we cannot determine
which of these estimates are biased.
24
                                                     
23 To test the robustness of these results, we ran two more specifications: One with the highest level of
educational attainment and a variable measuring the number of years of schooling above the highest
level attained (ExYrs) and another one with the number of imputed years of education and ExYrs.  The
results from both specifications support the above findings.  They indicate that the return to the “extra
year” of education that does not lead to a degree is significantly lower than the return to an imputed
year or to a year of completed degree, and that these returns are lower (not significantly so in the
second specification) in 1989 than in 1996.
24 Our data also permit us to estimate the returns to a field of study for a given level of education. We
have carried out this analysis to see whether there was a shift in the returns to fields of study from the
communist regime to the market system. As we show in Table A.5, we have found that with one
exception, there was no statistically significant change in the returns to the different fields of study
from 1989 to 1996 for men who only attained an apprentice education.  For men whose highest level of
education was vocational high school, most of the coefficients on the fields of study rose by between
15 and 25 percentage points from 1989 to 1996.  Men trained in business & trade services gained
relatively more over this period, as did men in manufacturing and electrotechnics. Those trained in law,
teaching and “other social branches” saw no change in their returns. For the university educated men
all the coefficients basically doubled in size between 1989 and 1996.  The high outlier was law where
returns rose by a factor of almost three.  On the low end, the returns of those trained in health, teachingFinally, we have tested the hypothesis that education obtained under communism is less
appropriate for a market economy and hence receives a lower rate of return during the transition
period than post-communist education. We have tested two specifications: (a) entering for each
man separately his total number of years of communist and post-communist education and (b)
entering separately only post-primary education. The resulting estimates do not allow us to reject
the hypothesis that the communist and post-communist education generates the same rate of
return. The result is consistent with the hypothesis that education obtained under communism
was appropriate for a market economy as well as the hypothesis that reforms of the educational
system have proceeded slowly during the transition.
5. Returns to Experience
In the first two panels of Table 9 we present the estimated coefficients and standard errors
of the experience and experience squared terms from the cross-sectional and job start data,
respectively. As may be seen from the various estimates of these two coefficients, men’s
experience-earnings profiles are concave in both the communist and transition periods and they
resemble remarkably the profiles estimated in market economies. In comparing the estimated
coefficients from the communist and transition periods, we find that there was virtually no
change in the parameter estimates from 1989 to 1996 and 1955-99 to 1991-96, respectively (first
two panels in Table 9).
25 Moreover, we find that the wage-experience profile peaked around 26
years of experience in both 1989 and 1996.
                                                                                                                                                                          
and “other social branches” did not change over time. Our data hence reveal important shifts in the
returns to some fields of study.  As expected, education in business and trade services has become
more highly rewarded. Similarly, the higher rate of return for university educated lawyers is consistent
with the increase in demand for legal services during the process of privatization and restructuring.
25 The F test statistics are F(2, 3547) = 0.07 for the 1989 vs. 1996 comparison based on the specification
with years of education, F(2, 3539) = 0.28 for the 1989 vs. 1996 comparison based on the specificationWe next tested the extent to which the experience-earnings profile changed over time. F
tests performed on the estimates obtained from the time-varying models (Tables A.6 and A.7)
indicate that the profile was changing slightly during the 1955-90 period of communism but
remained constant during the 1991-96 period of transition. In particular, while the 1955-90 time-
varying coefficients on experience and experience squared are individually not statistically
significant, at the 5 percent significance test level one cannot reject the hypothesis that they are
jointly different from zero. In contrast, the corresponding coefficients for the 1991-96 period are
individually as well as jointly insignificant.
26 Finally, the tests of equality of the time-varying
coefficients between the 1955-90 and 1991-96 periods indicate that one cannot reject the
hypothesis of equality of the experience profile during the two periods.
27
Overall, the cross-sectional and start wage estimates of the effects of experience on
earnings suggest that men’s profiles evolved slightly under communism but did not change from
the communist period to the period of transition to a market economy. These results are
provocative because they imply that the experience-earnings profile under communism
approximated the Mincerian human capital earnings function and was not substantially altered
during the first six years of the transition.
The similarity of the experience-earnings profile generated under the communist wage
grid, during the transition and in market economies has led western economists wonder about the
principles of wage setting under communism. Robert Flanagan (1993) for instance interpreted his
aggregate findings to mean that “communists were good human capitalists,” while Walter Oi
                                                                                                                                                                          
with levels of education,  F(2, 3266) = 0.02 for the 1955-89 vs. 1991-96 comparison based on the
specification with years of education, and F(2, 3251) = 0.03 for the 1955-89 vs. 1991-96 comparison
based on the specification with levels of education.
26 The test statistics for the joint significance of the time-varying experience and experience squared
coefficients are F(2, 1230) = 3.31 under communism and F(2, 2078) = 0.78 during the transition.wondered if communist planners “copied Jacob Mincer.”
28 As we have indicated earlier, the
communist wage grid predates Jacob Mincer’s and Gary Becker’s writings. As is evident from
Tables 1 and 2, the grid also has a long flat part in its profile, thus making the similarity of
communist wage setting and the human capital theory all the more intriguing. After examining
several communist wage grids and the institutional information surrounding their determination,
we fit the quadratic Mincerian earnings-experience function to the parameters of three
communist wage grids dating from 1954, 1979 and 1984. Interestingly, the estimated wage grid
coefficients, reported in the third panel of Table 9, are quite similar to those obtained by fitting
actual wage data from 1955-89 and 1989. As we show by plotting both actual and fitted wage
grid data in Figure 1(a)-(c), the Mincerian experience-earnings profile fits the actual wage grid
parameters in each of the three years during communism.  Hence, while ideology led the planners
to impose narrow education-related wage differentials and cap the experience-earnings profile,
they built into the grid enough wage progression with initial years of experience to generate a
Mincerian-type quadratic profile in the grid and the actual wage data.
In the last row of Table 9 and in panel (d) of Figure 1 we also present the profile fitted to
the wage grid used by the public sector and most privatized SOEs in 1998. As may be seen from
the plot and the underlying parameter estimates, the “democratic regime” wage grid may also be
approximated very closely by a quadratic experience-earnings function. In fact, the fine gradation
of earnings with seniority in the 1998 grid makes the fit very precise.
Finally, as with education, we have tested the hypothesis that experience obtained after
1989 generates higher rates of return in the transitional market economy than experience
                                                                                                                                                                          
27 The relevant F statistic is F(4, 3266) = 0.29.
28 Commentary made at the 1997 Conference on the Handbook of Labor Economics, Princeton
University.accumulated under communism. Since the 1996 cross-sectional data do not have sufficient
variation in the values of the post-communist experience variable, we have carried out the test on
the 1991-96 job start data.  We find that individually and jointly the coefficients on the two types
of experience and experience squared are not different from one another.
29 The direct test hence
indicates that the communist and transition experience command the same rate of return.
6. Public vs. Private Sector Returns to Human Capital
As we mentioned earlier, the relative behavior of SOEs, privatized SOEs and newly
created private firms is one of the fundamental issues in transition economics. In the context of
our inquiry, the interesting question is whether the flexibility of new private entrepreneurs leads
them to deviate from the communist era wage grid and reward human capital more in line with
its productivity than their privatized and non-privatized SOE counterparts. This is an open
question since post-communist adjustments in the wage grid, reduction of government subsidies
to the SOEs, and the opening up of the economy to international competition may have induced
important changes in the pay policies of the SOEs and privatized SOEs as well. Whether the
returns to human capital would be higher in the de novo private, privatized or public sector firms
depends on the relative magnitudes of these effects.
In Table 10 we present the estimated coefficients for education and experience from
equation (1), using the 1996 data stratified by three types of ownership: a) SOE and public
administration, b) privatized SOEs and cooperatives, and c) de novo private firms.  In Panel A of
the table we report the results using education specified in years, while in the Panel B we present
the results using education by highest level attained.
Our basic finding is that while the estimated coefficient on education is higher in
privatized SOEs, cooperatives and de novo private firms than in  SOEs and public
administration, one cannot reject the hypothesis that firms of all three ownership types pay the
                                                     
29 The F test value on the joint significance is F(2, 2078) = 1.22.same rate of return to a year of education. Moreover, individual pair-wise tests of differences
between the relevant coefficients indicate that there are no significant differences in the rates of
return across ownership types when education is measured by the highest level of schooling
attained.
With respect to experience we find that the de novo private firms pay significantly higher
returns than SOEs and public administration on a year of experience to male employees with low
experience (i.e., recent entrants into the labor market).  Men’s wage-experience profiles hence
begin steeper in de novo firms than in SOEs and public administration, but they are also more
concave and have an earlier turning point.  It is also the case that men’s experience profiles are
not significantly different in SOEs and Public Administration than in the privatized enterprise
and coops, but they are significantly different in the de novo private firms.
In order to provide a deeper understanding of how the wage-experience relationship
varies with ownership, we have also estimated spline experience-earnings profiles, where the
splines capture three ten-year experience intervals from the start of one’s career and one
remaining time interval thereafter. As may be seen from Figure 2, the spline estimates for men,
based on data from the SOEs and public administration, as well as the privatized firms, reflect
the upward sloping and then flat profile that corresponds to the wage grid profile in panel (d) of
Figure 1. The only difference lies in the fact that while the grid has a positive concave slope until
30 years of experience, the estimated coefficients yield a positive and significant slope in the first
10 years of one’s career, and positive but statistically insignificant slope between 10 and 30 years
of experience. The estimated profile from data on men working in the de novo private firms is
similar but contains a decreasing segment for individuals with more than 30 years of experience.
The greater concavity of the wage-experience profile in the de novo private firms, detected in the
quadratic experience specification of equation (1), is hence also reflected in the estimated spline
functions.
Our analysis hence indicates that six years into the transition the rate of return to
education is basically the same across the three principal ownership categories of firms. The onlydifference among the ownership categories is that de novo private firms pay more to younger
men with recent work experience.
7. Shifts in Industry Wage Premiums between 1989 and 1996
The literature on inter-industry wage differentials has found that these differentials are
relatively persistent and that the ranking of industries by the level of wages they pay was similar
in the market and planned economies. These findings were found to hold irrespective of whether
one controlled for other factors (e.g., Krueger and Summers, 1987 and Rutkowski, 1994) and
they implicitly pointed to a similar set of outcomes in the western labor markets and the
communist wage grids at the industry level.
In order to generate new findings that would be comparable to the existing literature, we
analyze industry intercepts from the 1989 and 1996 regressions in which we control for years of
education and experience. These intercepts are industry wage differentials relative to agriculture,
holding constant human capital characteristics of workers.
30
Analogously to the approach adopted by Krueger and Summers (1987), in Figure 3 we
depict a plot of the industry intercepts for 1989 and 1996. The pattern shows a significant shift in
men’s inter-industry wage structure.
31  In particular, men’s 1989 and 1996 relative wage
differentials line up close to a downward sloping line and generate a negative correlation
coefficient of –0.41. The wage scatter suggests that the relative wages in finance and mining and
quarrying have decreased, while those in trade, transport and telecommunications, light
manufacturing, and “other” activities gained, between 1989 and 1996. The long-term stability of
the inter-industry wage differentials, documented in the earlier literature, hence appears to have
been changed as a result of the transition.
                                                     
30 These coefficients are reported in full in Table A.3.
31 The reported pattern is very similar to the one obtained when one does not control for workers’ human
capital characteristics.In order to verify the scatter diagram analysis, in Table 11 we report the industry
intercepts and tests of significance of their differences between 1989 and 1996. An examination
of the 1989-96 differences in these intercepts indicates that five out of eight are statistically
significant. Men working in mining and quarrying indeed lost much of their former wage
premium, while those in trade, transport and telecommunications, light manufacturing, and
“other” activities gained significantly.  However, the large decline in men’s wage differential in
finance, insurance and real estate turns out not to be statistically significant. The interesting
question is why we do not find a positive difference in intercepts in this expanding sector that has
been hiring employees at very high wages? The answer given by our analysis is that the high
wages in the finance sector reflect the high levels of human capital among the new hires. Finally,
a more detailed analysis of the differentials in Table 11 indicates that agriculture, the base sector
whose share in total output and employment shrank dramatically, lost also in terms of its wage
differential relative to the rest of the economy.
8. Conclusions
In this study we have analyzed the returns to human capital under the Communist wage
grid (1955-1990) and the changes in wages and returns to human capital that took place during
the transition (1991-96) as (a) new private firms started paying market wages and (b) state owned
enterprises (SOEs), public administration and privatized firms used a new post-communist grid
to set wages. In order to carry out this analysis, we have collected a special retrospective data set
in the Czech Republic, a country that, unlike Poland and Hungary, maintained the centrally
planned system intact until the very end of the communist era.
Overall, we show that the functioning communist system succeeded in using the wage
grid to set and maintain for decades extremely small wage differentials. Indeed, the estimated
rate of return on education is very small and constant for decades during the communist rule. At
the level of individual and household incomes, the effects of the wage grid translated into the
most egalitarian distribution of income in the world.The transition from the centrally planned to a market system resulted in a major gradual
increase in the rates of return to education, with the rates of return reaching West European levels
by 1996. This increase is found in all ownership categories of firms. Hence, in the face of the
reduced subsidies to SOEs and the opening of the economy to world competition, the new wage
grid used by SOEs, public administration and privatized SOEs did not cause these firms to
deviate substantially in terms of returns to education from the de novo private firms.
Our cross-sectional and longitudinal estimates of the effects of experience on earnings
indicate that men’s wage-experience profile was concave in both regimes and did not change
from the communist to the transition period. These results imply that the experience-wage grid
used by planners to set starting wages was maintained during the entire communist period and
was not substantially altered during the first six years of the transition. However, we find that the
de novo private firms have a more concave profile than SOEs and public administration and that
they pay a higher experience return than SOEs and public administration to the recent entrants in
the labor market.
Contrary to earlier studies that found the inter-industry wage structure to be stable and
similar in market and centrally planned economies, we show that men’s inter-industry wage
structure changed substantially between 1989 and 1996 as the economy switched from central
planning to a nascent market system. In particular, men working in mining and quarrying lost
much of their former wage premium, while those in trade, transport and telecommunications,
light manufacturing, and “other” activities gained significantly.References
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Level of Difficulty
Education Experience  I II III IV I II III IV …
< 3 years 1681 1867 2092 2428 1264 1436 1607 1867 …
3-10 years 1868 2074 2324 2697 1404 1595 1786 2074 …
10+ years - - - - 1572 1786 2000 2323 …
< 3 years 1604 1782 1997 2317 1148 1305 1462 1697 …
3-10 years 1782 1980 2218 2574 1276 1450 1624 1885 …
10+ years - - - - 1429 1624 1819 2111 …
< 3 years 1528 1690 1901 2206 1033 1175 1316 1527 …
3-10 years 1697 1886 2112 2451 1148 1305 1462 1697 …
10+ years - - - - 1286 1462 1637 1901 …
Note: The salaries were also adjusted for overtime premiums according to a catalog that accompanied each grid.
Table 1
1954 Czechoslovak Wage Grid
The present grid determined monthly wages in Czechoslovak Crowns for specific occupational categories in agriculture. A grid of this kind 
existed for each of 20 industries and covered subclasses within 3 occupational classes (managers, blue collar employees and white collar 
workers). Within the grid, the level of difficulty of each job was determined by various characteristics of each occupation and the number of 
supervised employees.
Occupation(Director) Occupation(Chief accountant)
Less than  High 
School
Level of Difficulty Level of Difficulty
University+
High SchoolWage Hours worked
 Scale per week 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
1 42.5 5.3 6 6.7 7.6 8.5 9.6 10.8 12.1 13.6
41.25 5.5 6.2 6.9 7.8 8.8 9.9 11.1 12.4 13.9
40 5.6 6.3 7.1 8 9 10.1 11.4 12.8 14.4
36 6.3 7.1 8 9 10.1 11.3 12.7 14.3 16.1
2 42.5 5.6 6.3 7.1 8 9 10.1 11.4 12.8 14.4
41.25 5.8 6.5 7.3 8.3 9.3 10.4 11.7 13.1 14.8
40 6 6.7 7.6 8.5 9.6 10.8 12.1 13.6 15.3
36 6.6 7.4 8.4 9.5 10.6 11.9 13.4 15.1 17
3 42.5 6 6.7 7.6 8.5 9.6 10.8 12.1 13.6 15.3
41.25 6.2 6.9 7.8 8.8 9.9 11.1 12.4 13.9 15.7
40 6.3 7.1 8 9 10.1 11.4 12.8 14.4 16.2
36 7.1 8 9 10.1 11.3 12.7 14.3 16.1 18.1
4 42.5 6.3 7.1 8 9 10.1 11.4 12.8 14.4 16.2
41.25 6.5 7.3 8.3 9.3 10.4 11.7 13.1 14.8 16.7
40 6.7 7.6 8.5 9.6 10.8 12.1 13.6 15.3 17.2
36 7.4 8.4 9.5 10.6 11.9 13.4 15.1 17 19.2
5 42.5 6.7 7.6 8.5 9.6 10.8 12.1 13.6 15.3 17.2
41.25 6.9 7.8 8.8 9.9 11.1 12.4 13.9 15.7 17.7
40 7.1 8 9 10.1 11.4 12.8 14.4 16.2 18.3
36 8 9 10.1 11.3 12.7 14.3 16.1 18.1 20.4
6 42.5 7.1 8 9 10.1 11.4 12.8 14.4 16.2 18.3
41.25 7.3 8.3 9.3 10.4 11.7 13.1 14.8 16.7 18.8
40 7.6 8.5 9.6 10.8 12.1 13.6 15.3 17.2 19.4
36 8.4 9.5 10.6 11.9 13.4 15.1 17 19.2 21.6
7 42.5 7.6 8.5 9.6 10.8 12.1 13.6 15.3 17.2 19.4
41.25 7.8 8.8 9.9 11.1 12.4 13.9 15.7 17.7 20
40 8 9 10.1 11.4 12.8 14.4 16.2 18.3 20.6
36 9 10.1 11.3 12.7 14.3 16.1 18.1 20.4 22.9
8 42.5 8 9 10.1 11.4 12.8 14.4 16.2 18.3 20.6
41.25 8.3 9.3 10.4 11.7 13.1 14.8 16.7 18.8 21.2
40 8.5 9.6 10.8 12.1 13.6 15.3 17.2 19.4 21.8
36 9.5 10.6 11.9 13.4 15.1 17 19.2 21.6 24.3
9 42.5 8.5 9.6 10.8 12.1 13.6 15.3 17.2 19.4 21.8
41.25 8.8 9.9 11.1 12.4 13.9 15.7 17.7 20 22.5
40 9 10.1 11.4 12.8 14.4 16.2 18.3 20.6 23.2
36 10.1 11.3 12.7 14.3 16.1 18.1 20.4 22.9 25.8
Note: The  classification into a wage scale (row) was a function of a person's occupation  
and difficulty of work. The wage class (column) was determined by a person's level of 
experience.  To determine the appropriate wage for a given person, one had to find the 
occupation in the accompanying catalog, where these cells were defined. As an example, 
a machine driver would move from wage classes 4 to 6 over his/her career. In year one, 
the person would be in wage class 4, and wage scale 3.  After X  years of experience 
he/she would move to wage class 5 and after Y more years of experience to wage class 6. 
The rate at which one crossed the wage classes over time (experience profile) varied for 
different occupational and qualification levels. 
Table 2
Wage Classes
1984 Czechoslovak Wage Grid
By 1982, the planners moved from separate grids defined for each industry and 
occupation to one grid for the entire economy.  The hourly rate was specified for different 
hours of work per week as follows:Salary Class  < 1 yr.  1-2 3-4 5-6 7-9 10-12 13-15 16-19 20-23 24-27 28-32 >32
1 3,250 3390 3550 3700 3850 4000 4170 4330 4490 4,660 4,820 4,980
2 3560 3720 3880 4050 4210 4380 4540 4720 4900 5080 5250 5430
… . . . . . . . . . . . .
11 8800 9250 9710 10170 10620 11080 11540 11980 12440 12910 13370 13840
12 10,000 10520 11030 11560 12070 12590 13120 13640 14170 14,710 15,230 15,760
           
  
Note:  Salary classes were  defined by occupational and education categories. The slope of the wage-experience profile was 
the same for all salary classes (rows of the grid). Bonuses of up to 30% of salary were also allowed.
1998 Wage Grid for the Public Sector in the Czech Republic
Table 3
Years of experience
The 1998 wage grid for the public sector resembled in many respects the 1984 communist wage grid.  However, the 1998 
grid was simpler and the wage experience profile was much finer (12 categories) as well as steeper in 1998 than in the 
previous years.(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Wage Experience Profiles from the 1954, 1979, 1986 and 1998 Wage Grids (Actual Grid Data Points and Curve 
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.4Men's Spline Experience Profiles in 1996 by Enterprise Ownership
Figure 2
30 10 Exp
ln w Privatised & 
Coops
30 10 Exp






1     Agriculture=base (excluded)
2     Mining, Quarrying, Energy Production and Distribution
3     Construction  
4     Wholesale, Retail, and Private Services
5     Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate
6     Transport and Telecommunications
7     Manufacturing-machinery
8     Manufacturing-Other
9     Public Administration, Education, Health, and Army
10   Other
Dummy Variables (1989 vs. 1996)





















Country  Years Men Men&Women Men Men&Women
CEE
Czech Republic (1)  1989, 1996 0.027 0.058
Czech Republic (2) 1984, 1993 0.024 0.052
East Germany (3)  1989, 1991 0.044 0.041
East Germany (4)  1988, 1991 0.077 0.062
Poland (5) 1987, 1992 0.05 0.07
Slovakia (1)  1984, 1993 0.028 0.049
CIS
Russia (6) 1991, 1994 0.031 0.067
United States (4) 1989 0.085 0.093
Latin America
Argentina (7) 1989 0.103
Chile (7) 1989 0.120
Mexico (7) 1984 0.141
Venezuela (7) 1989 0.084
Europe
Germany (7) 1987 0.049
Great Britain (7) 1984 0.068
Switzerland (7) 1987 0.079
Sources:
(1)Authors' calculations, see Table A.3 (5) Rutkowski, 1997.
(6) Brainerd, 1998.
(3) Bird et al., 1994. (7) Psacharopoulos, 1994.
(4) Krueger & Pischke, 1995.
(2) Chase, 1998.
Table 4
for the Czech Republic and Other Countries
Communism Transition
Estimated Returns to a Year of  Education, 
Cross-Sectional Evidence 
Note: Figures are reported coefficients from  human capital (Mincer, 1976) earnings functions.     
CEE= Central and East Europe.  
CIS = Commonwealth of Independent States.Years of Education
Years of Education*t
1Taken from Table A.6, standard errors in parentheses.





















-vocational H.S. (4 years)




-vocational H.S. (4 years)
-academic H.S. (4 years)
-university
1
Taken From Table A.4.
a
Significant at the 1% level.
b
Significant at the 5% level
c










Estimated Returns for Men by Level of Educational 


























Calculated annual returns within attainment level
2
2Using the estimated coefficients b on attainment in panel A, and the years of 




















Taken From Table A.6.
a
Significant at the 1% level.
b
Signficant at the 5% level
c
Significant at the 10% level.
Transition (1991-96)
Table 7
(Standard Errors in Parentheses)
Communism (1955-89)


















































   Years of Education 0.006 0.020
b 0.014
(0.007) (0.009) 0.17
Apprentices (1-2 years) 0.052 0.058 0.006
(0.054) (0.061) 0.94
Apprentices (3-4 years) 0.060 0.056 -0.004
(0.043) (0.055) 0.95












aSignificant at the 1% level.
bSignficant at the 5% level
cSignificant at the 10% level.
Table 8
Estimated Returns for Men by Level of Educational Attainment 
Holding Years of Education Constant
Note:  Standard errors in parentheses and P-values for differences in the 
coefficients in italics.  The regressions also include control dummies for child 






































Note:  All coefficients statistically significant at 1% confidence level.
1
Table A.3, years of education.
2
Table A.4, levels of education.
3
Table A.6, years of education.
4
Table A.7, levels of education.
Estimated  Returns to a Year of Labor Market               
Experience of Men
(Standard Errors in Parentheses)
Table 9SOE& Public 
Administration
Privatized 
























2 0.226 0.209 0.212
No. of obs. 384 504 604
Panel B:
Apprentice with 2 years 0.129 0.114
c 0.101
(0.117) (0.064) (0.135)
Aprentice with 3-4 years 0.097 0.156
a 0.065
(0.102) (0.057) (0.114)































2 0.238 0.241 0.247
No. of obs. 384 504 604
1The regressions also control for child benefits, gross income, and industry dummies (equation 1).
aSignificant at the 1% level.
bSignificant at the 5% level
cSignificant at the 10% level
Table 10
Estimated Returns to Human Capital of Men in 1996 by Public-Private Ownership
1
(Standard Errors in Parentheses)1989 1996












Finance, Insur. & Real Estate 0.203 0.052 -0.152
(0.139) (0.080) 0.34












Public Admin., Education & Health 0.021 0.060 0.038
(0.035) (0.038) 0.46
Not known -0.062 0.204 0.265
c
(0.079) (0.115) 0.06
1Source: Columns 3, 5, 7 and 9 of Table A.3 where education is measured in years.
aSignificant at the 1% level
bSignficant at the 5% level
cSignficant at the 10% level
NOTES:   Base = Agriculture; Standard errors in parentheses; P values from Chi 
Square test on differences in coefficients are in italics.
1996-1989
(Standard Errors in Parentheses)
Table 11
Changes in Men's Industry Wage Structure from 1989 to 1996
11989 1996
mean st.dev. mean st.dev.
Log of monthly wage 8.227 (0.394) 8.961 (0.404)
Experience (years) 18.2 (11.5) 20.4 (12.0)
Experience
2
463.3 (490.4) 559.8 (545.5)
Education in years 12.776 (2.519) 12.626 (2.347)
Highest level of education attained:
Apprentices w/2 years 0.048 (0.213) 0.035 (0.184)
Apprentices w/3 years 0.484 (0.500) 0.503 (0.500)
Vocational H.S. w/4 years 0.258 (0.438) 0.274 (0.446)
Academic H.S. w/4 years 0.022 (0.147) 0.023 (0.149)
University 0.131 (0.338) 0.119 (0.323)
Field of highest level of education:
Apprenticeship:
Machine control 0.028 (0.164) 0.029 (0.168)
Manuf. Machinery and Metalurgy 0.199 (0.399) 0.200 (0.400)
Electrotechnics, transport, telecom. 0.069 (0.254) 0.073 (0.260)
Chemistry, Food processing 0.016 (0.125) 0.018 (0.132)
Textile, Clothing 0.007 (0.084) 0.004 (0.061)
Wood, Shoes manufacturing 0.025 (0.157) 0.031 (0.173)
Construction 0.089 (0.284) 0.089 (0.284)
Agriculture, Forestry 0.040 (0.197) 0.042 (0.202)
Trade, Services 0.029 (0.168) 0.022 (0.145)
Other 0.030 (0.170) 0.031 (0.173)
Academic High School 0.022 (0.147) 0.023 (0.149)
Vocational High School :
Natural sciences 0.004 (0.060) 0.002 (0.050)
Manufacturing-Machinery 0.091 (0.288) 0.094 (0.292)
Electrotechnics 0.046 (0.209) 0.058 (0.235)
Construction 0.019 (0.136) 0.017 (0.130)
Other technical branches 0.016 (0.127) 0.018 (0.135)
Agriculture 0.023 (0.149) 0.022 (0.147)
Health 0.003 (0.055) 0.006 (0.074)
Business, Trade, Services 0.028 (0.164) 0.027 (0.162)
Law 0.001 (0.032) 0.001 (0.035)
Teaching 0.002 (0.045) 0.002 (0.050)
Other social branches 0.005 (0.071) 0.004 (0.065)
Other 0.021 (0.142) 0.020 (0.141)
University:
Natural sciences 0.010 (0.098) 0.007 (0.082)
Manufacturing-Machinery 0.023 (0.150) 0.024 (0.153)
Electrotechnics 0.009 (0.096) 0.009 (0.096)
Construction 0.013 (0.112) 0.012 (0.107)
Table A.1
Means and Standard Deviation of Variables in Cross-Sectional DataCommunism
Log of earnings 8.049 (0.549) 8.509 (0.484)
Experience 7.009 (9.178) 13.442 (12.653)
Exper. x time -640 (1185) 381 (535)
Experience 
2
135 (303) 341 (512)
Exper. 
2 x time -11052 (24646) 9438 (19184)
Years of education 12.843 (2.526) 12.428 (2.261)
Education x time -1810 (1522) 383 (282)
Apprentice (2 years) 0.037 (0.190) 0.036 (0.185)
Apprentice (2) x time 1.056 (6.863)
Apprentice (3 years) 0.475 (0.500) 0.533 (0.499)
Apprentice (3) x time -64.5 (101.8) 16.3 (22.0)
Vocational H.S. 0.268 (0.443) 0.243 (0.429)
Vocational H.S. x time -39.1 (87.6) 7.6 (17.3)
Academic H.S. 0.022 (0.146) 0.036 (0.185)
Academic H.S. x time -3.5 (30.0) 1.4 (8.0)
University 0.143 (0.350) 0.101 (0.302)
University x time -17.2 (60.2) 2.8 (10.8)
Prague 0.111 (0.314) 0.121 (0.327)
Child ben. incl, 0.136 (0.343) 0.089 (0.284)
Gross earnings 0.258 (0.437) 0.226 (0.418)
Machine Control 0.093 (0.290) 0.049 (0.216)
Electro., trans., tele.m. 0.098 (0.298) 0.175 (0.380)
Chemistry, Food processing 0.096 (0.295) 0.187 (0.390)
Textile, Clothing 0.125 (0.331) 0.112 (0.315)
Wood, Shoes manufac. 0.007 (0.083) 0.012 (0.108)
Construction 0.075 (0.264) 0.062 (0.241)
Agriculture, Forestry 0.244 (0.429) 0.254 (0.435)
Trade, Services 0.134 (0.341) 0.080 (0.272)
Other 0.007 (0.083) 0.008 (0.089)
26-100 employees 0.245 (0.430)
101-500 employees 0.209 (0.407)
>500 employees 0.172 (0.377)
Not known 0.038 (0.192)
Privatised 0.163 (0.370)
Public administration 0.089 (0.285)
Private established 0.495 (0.500)
Cooperative 0.032 (0.177)
Other & not known 0.081 (0.272)
Employer 0.018 (0.131)
Self-employed 0.061 (0.240)
HH helper + Not known 0.010 (0.102)
No. of Obs. 1285 2107
Transition
Means and Standard Deviation of Variables for Start Date Data
Table A.2 (1) (2) (1) (2)
Education 0.026 0.027 0.058 0.058
(0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005)
Experience 0.022 0.021 0.020 0.021
(0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005)
Experience
2 -0.0005 -0.0004 -0.0004 -0.0004
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Prague - 0.015 - 0.120
- (0.027) - (0.032)
Child benefits included - 0.061 - 0.064
- (0.022) - (0.026)
Gross earinings - 0.122 - 0.069
- (0.020) - (0.022)
Industry:
Mining & Quarrying - 0.251 - 0.092
- (0.039) - (0.044)
Construction - 0.051 - 0.131
- (0.035) - (0.040)
Wholesale and  Retail Trade - 0.025 - 0.163
- (0.037) - (0.041)
Finance, Insur. & Real Estate - 0.203 - 0.052
- (0.139) - (0.080)
Transport & Telecommunications - 0.059 - 0.146
- (0.036) - (0.040)
Manufacturing-Food, Textile,  - 0.017 - 0.092
- (0.028) - (0.033)
Manufacturing-Machinery - -0.005 - 0.066
- (0.030) - (0.037)
Public Admin., Education & Health - 0.060
- (0.035) - (0.038)
Not known - -0.062 - 0.204
- (0.079) - (0.115)
Constant 7.704 7.620 8.060 7.916
(0.050) (0.055) (0.063) (0.071)
adj.R
2 0.069 0.118 0.162 0.190
nobs 1955 1951 1639 1627
Base= people working outside Prague, whose earnings are net of tax and child 
benefits, and who work in agriculture.
1989 1996
Table A.3
 Cross-sectional Earnings Functions, 1989 and 1996 
(Education by years)(1) (2) (1) (2)
Apprentice (2 years) 0.0701 0.0635 0.1128 0.0939
(0.052) (0.051) (0.058) (0.057)
Apprentice (3 years) 0.0923 0.0773 0.1434 0.1122
(0.038) (0.037) (0.049) (0.049)
Vocational H.S. 0.1374 0.1265 0.3228 0.2943
(0.040) (0.040) (0.050) (0.050)
Academic H.S. 0.1525 0.1346 0.3822 0.3508
(0.080) (0.081) (0.102) (0.107)
University 0.2793 0.2826 0.5515 0.5439
(0.044) (0.045) (0.058) (0.059)
Experience 0.022 0.021 0.024 0.024
(0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005)
Experience
2 -0.00047 -0.00045 -0.00050 -0.00051
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Prague - 0.009 - 0.102
- (0.027) - (0.032)
Child benefits included - 0.065 - 0.076
- (0.021) - (0.026)
Gross earnings - 0.125 - 0.080
- (0.020) - (0.021)
Sector:
Mining & Quarrying - 0.250 - 0.095
- (0.039) - (0.043)
Construction - 0.053 - 0.145
- (0.035) - (0.040)
Wholesale and  Retail Trade - 0.020 - 0.150
- (0.036) - (0.040)
Finance, Insur. & Real Estate - 0.210 - 0.024
- (0.131) - (0.076)
Transport & Telecommunications - 0.057 - 0.149
- (0.036) - (0.039)
Manufacturing-Food, Textile,  - 0.018 - 0.092
- (0.028) - (0.032)
Manufacturing-Machinery - -0.010 - 0.066
- (0.030) - (0.036)
Public Admin., Education & Health - 0.012 - 0.034
- (0.035) - (0.038)
Not known - -0.064 - 0.180
- (0.082) - (0.111)
Constant 7.910 7.847 8.516 8.404
(0.043) (0.046) (0.054) (0.059)
adj.R
2 0.070 0.120 0.181 0.210
nobs 1955 1951 1639 1627




Cross-sectional Earnings Functions, 1989 and 1996
(Education by levels) Cross-sectional Earnings Functions, 1989 and 1996 
1989 1996
Apprenticeship Fields of study:
Machine control 0.123 0.084
(0.053) (0.062)
Manuf. Machinery and Metalurgy 0.113 0.139
(0.040) (0.051)
Electrotechnics, transport, telecom. 0.076 0.122
(0.045) (0.056)
Chemistry, Food processing 0.122 0.031
(0.068) (0.085)
Textile, Clothing -0.056 -0.194
(0.071) (0.133)




Agriculture, Forestry -0.040 -0.007
(0.053) (0.064)




Academic High School 0.138 0.352
(0.081) (0.106)
Fields within vocational high school:
































Child benefits included 0.228 0.119
(0.040) (0.030)
Gross Earnings*t 0.133 0.042
(0.051) (0.044)
Industry:




Wholesale and  Retail Trade -0.054 0.119
(0.059) (0.045)
Finance, Insur. & Real Estate 0.116 0.005
(0.208) (0.082)
Transport & Telecommunications 0.096 0.101
(0.063) (0.055)




Public Admin., Education & Health 0.094 0.065
(0.051) (0.047)








for Communism and Transition
(Education in Years)
Base= individuals working outside Prague in agriculture, whose earnings 
are net of tax and child benefits.
Earnings Regressions with Time Varying CofficientsPeriod Communism Transition
Apprentice (2 years) 0.0566 -0.0783
(0.1007) (0.1062)
Apprentice (2 years)*t n.a. 0.007
n.a. (0.003)
Apprentice (3 years) 0.0690 0.0489
(0.0745) (0.0691)
Apprentice (3 years)*t 0.0000 0.0044
(0.0004) (0.0017)
Vocational H.S. 0.056 0.051
(0.082) (0.074)
Vocational H.S.*t -0.0001 0.0064
(0.0005) (0.002)
Academic H.S. 0.3378 0.0896
(0.1783) (0.1126)



















Child benefits included 0.228 0.122
(0.040) (0.029)
Gross earnings 0.134 0.048
(0.051) (0.044)
Gross earnings*t 0.000 0.002
(0.000) (0.001)
Table A.7
Earnings Regressions with Time Varying Cofficients
for Communism and Transition






















Wholesale and  Retail Trade 0.14520
(0.04204)
Finance, Insur. & Real Estate 0.04760
(0.04261)
Transport & Telecommunications 0.05978
(0.07874)























Marital status dummy -0.07363
(0.42330)
Per capitia HH income net of own income -0.00053
(0.00007)






Dummy if there is at least one child <15 years 0.94393
of age in the household (0.41898)
Constant -7.94086
(1.66155)
obs. 1670Industry: Socialism Transition




Wholesale and  Retail Trade -0.054 0.119
(0.059) (0.044)
Transport & Telecommunications 0.090 0.095
(0.063) (0.055)




Public Admin., Education & Health 0.083 0.055
(0.053) (0.047)








Base= Jr. H.S. graduates working outside Prague in agriculture, 
whose earnings net of tax and child benefits.
for Communism and Transition
Earnings Regressions with Time Varying Cofficients
Table A.7 continued














Fields within university education:


































Child Benefits  0.063 0.081
(0.021) (0.026)
Gross Earnings 0.130 0.085
(0.020) (0.021)
Industry:




Wholesale and  Retail Trade -0.005 0.098
(0.037) (0.041)
Finance, Insur. & Real Estate 0.167 -0.014
(0.132) (0.077)
Transport & Telecommunications 0.019 0.097
(0.037) (0.042)




Public Admin., Education & Health -0.015 0.017
(0.038) (0.041)
Not known -0.089 0.135
(0.082) (0.112)







(Education by Levels and Field of Study)
Base= Jr. H.S. graduates working outside Prague in agriculture, 
whose earnings net of tax and child benefits.1989 1996
mean st.dev. mean st.dev.
Other technical branches 0.010 (0.101) 0.008 (0.089)
Agriculture 0.013 (0.115) 0.012 (0.107)
Health 0.008 (0.087) 0.008 (0.089)
Business, Trade, Services 0.012 (0.110) 0.009 (0.096)
Law 0.006 (0.078) 0.005 (0.070)
Teaching 0.016 (0.125) 0.015 (0.123)
Other social branches 0.005 (0.068) 0.004 (0.061)
Other 0.006 (0.078) 0.006 (0.078)
Other variables
Prague 0.106 (0.307) 0.116 (0.320)
Child benefits included 0.197 (0.398) 0.110 (0.313)
Gross earnings reported 0.247 (0.431) 0.226 (0.418)
Industry:
Mining & Quarrying 0.088 (0.283) 0.074 (0.261)
Construction 0.116 (0.320) 0.122 (0.327)
Wholesale, Retail, 0.099 (0.299) 0.138 (0.345)
Broad public 0.127 (0.333) 0.136 (0.343)
Finance, Insurance, Renting & Real Estate 0.005 (0.068) 0.015 (0.121)
Transport, Telecommunications 0.082 (0.274) 0.082 (0.274)
Manufacturing-Food, Textile,  0.241 (0.428) 0.252 (0.434)
Manufacturing-Machinery 0.118 (0.323) 0.112 (0.315)
Households + Exteritorial + Not known 0.010 (0.101) 0.009 (0.096)
Firm Size
1-25 employees 0.211 (0.408)
101-500 employees 0.238 (0.426)
>500 employees 0.256 (0.437)
Not known 0.037 (0.190)
Ownership
Privatised 0.272 (0.445)
Public Administration 0.135 (0.341)
Private established 0.371 (0.483)
Cooperatives 0.037 (0.190)




HH Helper + Not known 0.008 (0.089)
Log of district level enemployment rate 0.035 (0.021)
No. of Obs.            1951 1627
Table A.1 continued
Means and Standard Deviation of Variables in Cross-Sectional Data